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CHAPTER 5 
Conclusion 
 
5.1. Summary 
The first study examines whether the possible earnings management of overoptimistic 
CEOs is recognized and included in the share price at the time the management forecast 
is issued, or whether investors react to the inferred (actual) earnings management at the 
announcement of realized earnings. In line with expectations the findings of the first study 
show that the market reacts more positively to the earnings announcements of 
overoptimistic CEOs in the small forecast error range compared to those of non-optimistic 
managers at the earnings announcement. These findings indicate that investors react 
negatively to the higher earnings management incentives of overoptimistic managers 
when the management forecast is issued and do not react to inferred earnings management 
of overoptimistic CEOs and/or react more positively to the inferred lack of earnings 
management by overoptimistic CEOs compared to non-optimistic managers when 
earnings are announced.  
The second study examines the role voluntary management earnings forecasts 
play in the generation of information asymmetry among investors around public 
disclosures. First, the findings show that in isolation, voluntary management forecasts 
generate higher information asymmetry among investors than mandatory earnings 
announcements as evidenced by higher excess trading volume reactions associated with 
both pre-announcement and event-period private information at the management forecast 
date compared to the trading volume reaction of non-forecasting firms at the earnings 
announcement. This implies that the information asymmetry among investors is higher 
when the disclosure involves predictions for the future compared to disclosures that 
confirm past events. Second, earnings announcements of forecasting firms are associated 
with lower information asymmetry among investors than earnings announcements of non-
forecasters since the excess trading volume reactions at the earnings announcement date 
associated with pre-announcement private information are lower, while those associated 
with event-period private information are not different across forecasters and non-
forecasters. Finally, examining the aggregate trading volume effects of management 
forecasts from around the forecast issue and the subsequent earnings announcement, the 
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study concludes that investors of forecasting firms face a larger overall information 
asymmetry than investors of non-forecasting firms as a result of the event-period 
information component.  
While the aggregate information asymmetry associated with pre-announcement 
information is not different between forecasting and non-forecasting firms, the aggregate 
information asymmetry associated with event-period information is higher for forecasters 
compared to non-forecasters. This implies that on average a management forecast 
generates the same level of disagreement among investors as an earnings announcement, 
and moreover, that, on average, management forecasts do not help in the processing of 
the subsequent earnings announcement. 
The third study examines whether different investor classes benefit equally from 
management forecasts, by comparing the economic consequences of small investors’ 
trading decisions to those of large investors around management forecast announcements 
compared to earnings announcements. First, results show that the trading behavior of 
small and large investors at the management forecast is different compared to that around 
the earnings announcement, and the difference in their trading behavior differs at the 
management forecast compared to earnings announcements. Furthermore, the trading 
behavior differential can be explained by differential trading on different forecast errors, 
because small investors trade in the direction of a random walk forecast error around the 
management forecast but not around earnings announcements, in contrast with large 
investors, whose trades are not associated with forecast errors around corporate 
announcements. Second, the trading behavior differential leads to differential profitability 
between small and large investors at the two announcements: management forecasts 
improve the profitability difference of small investors’ trades compared to earnings 
announcements by reversing a differential loss at the earnings announcement into a 
differential profit at the management forecast compared to large investors. Third, firm 
and forecast characteristics on average, do not help small investors to improve their 
profitability differential at management forecasts compared to earnings announcements. 
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